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INTRODUCTION 
Toward the end of 1988, Pakistan's deteriorating resource situation caused a 
financial crisis many remnants of which still exist today. In 1988 the 
Government's budget deficit reached 8.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
inflation accelerated, the current account deficit doubled to 4.3% of Gross 
National Product (GNP), the external debt service ratio reached 28% of export 
earnings, and foreign exchange reserves fell by half to $438 million, equal to less 
than three weeks~of imports (World Bank, 1991: ii). 
These developments have eroded the ability of the government to affect the 
country's development process. In fact, the encouragement of private sector 
activity, particularly investment, is the only viable option open to the 
authorities. It follows that for policy purposes the most important issue 
involves restructuring government expenditures and their financing in a manner 
that would provide the maximum inducement to private sector capital 
formation, especially in manufacturing. Operationally this means finding an 
optimal balance between the Government's three most important budgetary 
items: defense, public consumption and infrastructural development. More 
importantly because there is abundant evidence 1 that the government's deficits 
have crowded out a certain amount of private investment, the authorities must 
achieve this balance within the context of a reduced level of expenditures and/ or 
tax increases. 
Defense expenditures would seem to be a logical area for budgetary cuts: 
current expenditures account for the major part of government budgcG'ty 
allocations, averaging 65~75 percent in recent years. In fact, defense 
expenditure and debt servicing together account for 81.4 percent of current 
expenditure in the 1990/91 budget (Economist Intelligence Unit,1990: 39-40). 
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While not necessarily arguing that reduced defense expenditures would 
free up sufficient funds to restore the country's deteriorating capital stock2, the 
purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not defense expenditures have 
affected the private sector's willingness and ability to invest in manufacturing. 
Has the overall impact of defense expenditures on private investment in 
manufacturing differed significantly from that associated with other categories 
of government expenditures? If so, in what regard? Are these differences 
associated with the manner in which defense and expenditures in other areas are 
funded? 
BACKGROUND 
As noted, previous studies have indicated that government expenditures in 
Pakistan have been somewhat of a mixed blessing. On the one hand, these 
expenditures have the potential to increase private sector profitability either 
through increases in aggregate demand (the Keynesian effect) and/or cost 
reductions (the infrastructural effect). On the other hand, public expenditures 
appear to compete for funds with the private sector, thus reducing ceteris 
paribus the overall volume of private capital formation. 
Apparently these effects vary by expenditure category. For example, 
infrastructure investment has played a rather passive role in stimulating 
follow-on private investment3. Surprisingly, there is little evidence that 
government investment in manufacturing crowds out private investment. 
Instead there is a much greater likelihood that other forms of government 
investment may be responsible for the private sector's funding difficulties. In 
particular government investment in public enterprises and general government 
investment seem to be more responsible for the country's increasing fiscal 
imbalances. 
Little can be said on these issues until the issue of causation is adequately 
resolved: 
1. Often in studies of this type the direction of causation has implicitly been 
assumed to go from government deficits to expanded domestic borrowing to 
interest rate increases and ultimately reduced private investment. One could just 
as easily argue that increased levels of private investment have placed pressure 
on the government to expand facilities, especially in energy. The government, 
wishing to aid private investment while at the same time lacking adequate 
funding for major infrastructural programs, may first grant the private sector 
various forms of relief such as tax holidays followed by modest increases in pub-
lic investment. The outcome of this process would be expanded deficits, but 
not necessarily the crowding out of private investment in the classical sense. The 
.. 
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causation issue must be addressed before any definitive ronclusion can be made 
concerning crowding out. 
2. As a related issue, the timing of these impacts needs to be identified. 
Many of the effects associated with government deficits are likely to have a 
delayed impact on private investment decisions. Again because the timing of 
these effects has not been spelled out, the patterns of causation are unclear4. 
3. If we assume that interest rate effects are only one factor associated with the 
government deficit as it pertains to private investment, the theory of crowding 
out becomes unclear as to the relevant form of the budgetary deficit. If the 
interest rate mechanism is not perfect, are private investors more concerned or 
affected (through perhaps credit rationing) by the actual deficit, some sort of 
expected deficit, unanticipated changes in the deficit, or even deviations in the 
deficit from some longer run budgetary trend? 
4. The environment in which deficits exist needs to be identified. Obviously, 
if deficits stem largely from increased government consumption or defense, their 
negative impact on private investment will be greater than if they had stemmed 
simply from increased infrastructural investment. 
5. The financing of the public sector deficit and government capital 
formation needs to be examined in detail. Have the deficits been associated with 
government investment or consumption? How have the deficits been financed 
as between dome"Stic and foreign borrowing? Do the impacts of domestic versus 
foreign borrowing vary with regard to their effect on private industrial 
investors? 
THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION 
Ultimately any statistical test for causation will be based on a number of 
arbitrary assumptions. Still, using a number of alternative specifications for the 
key variables it is possible to make some credible inferences concerning the 
timing of say government expenditures and public sector deficits: do some types 
of government expenditure tend to generate a stream of deficits (and associated 
public borrowing) over time [(soft budgetary constraint) (Kornai, 3-30)] or are 
selected budgetary allocations constrained by past deficits (hard budgetary 
constraint). Similarly, which types of expenditures are more likely financed (or 
constrained) through the domestic capital markets and which are more reliant 
(or constrained) by foreign borrowing? 
The original and most widely used causality test was developed by Gran-
ger (1969). According to this test (again using tl\e example of public expendi-
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tures and deficits), deficits (DEF) affect growth of public sector expenditures 
(PE) if this series can be predicted more accurately by past values of deficits than 
by past (expenditure) growth patterns. To be certain that causality runs from 
deficits to PE, past values of the public deficit must also be more accurate than 
past values of public expenditures at predicting increases in the deficit. 
GRANGER TEST 
More formally, Granger defines causality such that X Granger causes (G-C) Y 
if Y can be predicted more accurately in the sense of mean square error, with the 
use of past values of X than without using past X. Based upon the definition of 
Granger causality, a simple bivariate autoregressive (AR) model for public 
deficits (DEF) and PE can be specified as follows: 
p q 
(1) PE (t) = c +SUM a (i)DEF (t-i) + SUM b (j) DEF (t-j) + u (t) 
i=l j=l 
r s 
(2) DEF (t) = c +SUM d (i) DEF (t-1) +SUM e (j) PE (t-j) +v (t) 
i=l j=l 
where PE is the growth in public sector expenditures and DEF = the growth in 
public sector deficits; p, q, rand s are lag lengths for each variable in the equation; 
and u and v a~ serially uncorrelated white noise residuals. By assuming that 
error terms (u, v) are "nice" ordinary least squares (OLS) becomes the 
appropriate estimation method5 . 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint F- test is 
appropriate for causal detection. Where: 
(RSS (x) - RSS (u)/(df (x) - df (u) 
(3) F = -----------
RSS (u)/df (u) 
RSS (r) and RSS (u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted and unrestricted 
models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respectively, the degrees of 
freedom in restricted and unrestricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner: first, 
unidirectional causality from DEF to PE if the F-J:est rejects the null hypothesis 
.. 
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that past values of DEF in equation (1) are insignificantly different from zero and 
if the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that past values of PE in equation (2) 
are insignificantly different from zero. That is, DEF causes PE but PE does not 
cause DEF. Unidirectional causality runs from PE to DEF if the reverse is true. 
Second, bidirectional causality runs between DEF and PE if both F-test statistics 
reject the null hypotheses in equations (1) and (2). Finally, no causality exists 
between DEF and PE if we cannot reject both null hypotheses at the conventional 
significance level. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of lag 
length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the omission of 
relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than the true lag length, 
the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be inefficient. While it is 
possible to choose lag lengths based on preliminary partial autocorrelation 
methods, there is no a priori reason to assume lag lengths equal for all types of 
deficits. 
THE HSAIO PROCEDURE 
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsaio (1981) developed a 
systematic method for assigning lags. This method combines Granger Causality 
and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean square 
prediction error, to determine the optimum lag for each variable. In a paper 
examining the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, Thornton and 
Batten (1985) foutld Hsiao's method to be superior to both arbitrary lag length 
selection and several other systematic procedures for determining lag length. 
The first step in Hsiao's procedure is to. perform a series of autoregressive 
regressions on the dependent variable. In the first regression, the dependent 
variable has a lag of one. This increases by one in each succeeding regression. 
Here, we estimate M regressions of the form: 
m 
(4) G(t) =·a+ Sum b (t-1) G (t-1) + e (i) 
i=l 
where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we compute the 
FPE in the following manner 
T+m+l 
(5) FPE (m) = ---- ESS (m)/T 
T-m-1 
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Where: Tis the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final prediction 
error and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal lag length, m'", is 
the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. Having determined m'" addi-
tional regressions expand the equation with the lags on the other variable added 
sequentially in the same manner used to determine m'". Thus we estimate four 
regressions of the form: 
m• n 
(6) G (t) =a+ Sum b (t-1) G (t-1) +Sum c (t-l)D (t-1) + e (i) 
i=l i=l 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for each 
regression as: 
T+ m•+n+ 1 
FPE (m'",n) = -----ESS (m'",n)/T 
T-m•-n-1 
we choose the optimal lag length for D, n'" as the lag length which produces the 
lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag length is equivalent 
to using a series of F tests with variable levels of significance6. 
The first term measures the estimation error and the second term measures 
the modelling ~rror. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality property that 
"balances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected and the risk due to 
increases in the variance when a higher order is selected" (Hsaio, 1979, 326). As 
noted by Judge et. al. (1982), an intuitive reason for using the FPE criterion is that 
longer lags increase the first term but decrease the RSS of the second term, and 
thus the two opposing forces are optimally balanced when their product reaches 
its minimum. 
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, four cases are 
possible: (a) Government Deficits cause Public Expenditures when the predic-
tion error for public expenditures decreases when the government deficit is 
included in the expenditure equation. In addition, when public expenditures 
are added to the deficit equation, the final prediction error should increase; (b) 
Public Expenditures causes Government Deficits when the prediction error for 
public expenditures increases when government deficits are added to the 
regression equation for public expenditures, and is reduced when public 
expenditures are added to the regression equation for government deficits; (c) 
Feedback occurs when the final prediction error decreases when government 
deficits are added to the public expenditures equation, and the final prediction 
error decreases when public expenditures are added to the government deficit 
89 
equation; and (d) No Relationship exists when the final prediction error 
increases both when government deficits are added to the public expenditures 
equation and when public expenditures are added to the deficit equation. 
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
The data used to carry out the causation tests7 was derived from figures in: 
World Bank, Pakistan: Current Economic Situation and Prospects--Report No. 
10223-PAK (March 16, 1992). World Bank, Pakistan: Current Economic Situation 
and Prospects-Report No. 9283-PAK (March 22, 1991); World Bank: Pakistan: 
Progress Under the Sixth Plan (1984). Gross Domestic Product and the GDP price 
deflator is from various issues of the International Monetary Fund, Interna-
tional Financial Statistics Yearbook. All variables were deflated by the GDP 
deflator and are in constant 1985 prices. For best statistical results 8, the variables 
were transformed into their logarithmic values. 
To determine the robustness of our findings and whether the results were 
sensitive to the definition of key variables various measures of the deficit were 
examined. These included the actual or realized deficit, the expected deficit (the 
predicted value obtained by regressing each year's deficit on its value for the 
previous year, the unexpected deficit (the difference between each year's actual 
deficit and that anticipated based on past patterns) and finally deviations of the 
deficit from its louger run growth path (the actual deficit minus the exponential 
trend in the deficit). The same definitions were used in deriving series for public 
domestic borrowing. 
Relationships were considered valid if they were statistically significant at 
the ninety-five percent level of confidence. That is, if ninety- five percent of the 
time we could conclude that they had not occurred by pure chance, we 
considered them statistically significant. 
As noted above, there is no theoretical reason to believe that fiscal deficits 
and government expenditures by category have a set lag relationship - that is 
they impact on one another over a fixed time period. To find the optimal 
adjustment period of impact, lag structures of up to six years were estimated. 
The lag structure with the highest level of statistical significance was the one 
chosen which best depicts the relationship under consideration (the optimal Jag 
reoorted in Tables 1 throu11:h 5)9. 
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RESULTS 
Two sets of causality tests were performed. The first set, (Tables 1 and 2) 
examines the interaction of the three broad categories of government 
expenditures: (a) defense, (b) consumption, and (c) general government invest-
ment and (d) infrastructure: (i) private sector investment in large scale 
manufacturing and (ii) private investment in small scale manufacturing enter-
prises. 
The second set of estimates examine the interrelationships between these 
four types of government expenditures and movements in the fiscal deficit. 
Since previous studies have suggested that it is not the deficits per se, but rather 
the method by which they are financed (domestic versus foreign) that 
determines whether crowding out occurs, the second set of tables also takes the 
analysis a step further by examining the corresponding link between public 
sector expenditures and the pattern of public sector domestic/foreign borrow-
ing. Put differently even though public expenditures in certain areas may lead to 
increased budgetary deficits, crowding out might not occur if the authorities are 
able to fund this expenditure through foreign borrowing. 
The analysis produced a number of interesting patterns which are sum-
marized in Tables 1-5. Those for public expenditures and private investment in 
manufacturing (Tables 1 and 2) provide an interesting contrast in the manner in 
which public sector spending has provided a stimulus to private sector capital 
formation. Specifically (Tables 1 and 2): 
1. The impact of defense expenditures (fable 1) on investment in large scale 
manufacturing appears consistently strong across all measures to of this category 
of expenditures. Also, in all cases the impact lag appears quite short, averaging 
only a year. 
2. In contrast to the case for large scale manufacturing, defense expenditures 
have no appreciable effect on private investment in small scale manufacturing 
(Table 2). 
3. As a basis of comparison public sector expenditures on consumption do 
not provide a stimulus to private investment in large scale manufacturing (Table 
1). Here, the pattern is largely one whereby expanded private sector activity 
induces the government to provide additional services. For public services 
(consumption) this process occurs over a fairly long time frame with an average 
lag of three years -- expanded private investment in large scale manufacturing 




Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, Deficits, 
Borrowing and Private Investment in Large Scale Manufacturing, 
1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
Invest Invest Expend Expend 
Invest Expend Expend Invest 
Defense Expenditures 
'.'1', 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 2 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.llE-1) (0.65E-2) (0.26E-2) (0.26E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.72 1.91 1.62 2.13 Defense-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 8.45 11.40 16.25 9.53 Investment 
Adjusted r2 0.982 0.990 0.985 0.984 (+m) 
Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 3 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.llE-1) (0.12E-1) (0.69E-2) (0.43E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.72 1.65 1.69 1.98 Investment-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 8.45 9.41 6.82 8.77 Consumption 
Adjusted r2 0.982 0.981 0.975 0.985 (+w) 
Public Investment (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.llE-1) (0.12E-1) (0.93E-2) (0.45E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.72 1.62 1.56 2.16 Private-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 8.45 8.57 5.22 14.02 Public 
Adjusted r2 0.982 0.983 0.935 0.959 (+m) 
Public Investment (infrastructure) 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 1 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.llE-1) (0.13E-1) (0.69E-2) (0.37E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.72 1.72 1.69 2.25 Private-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 8.45 9.46 4.99 7.95 Public 
Adjusted r2 0.982 0.981 0.932 0.958 (+w) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio Procedure 
was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in Iograthmic 
form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs(+,-) 
represent the direction of impact. In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest 
final prediction error of relationships B and D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 
2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s =Strong; m =moderate; w =weak) based on the 
size ofthe standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical significance. 
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Table 2: 
Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, Deficits, Borrowing and 
Private Investment in Small Scale Manufacturing, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
Invest Invest Expend Expend 
Invest Expend Expend Invest 
Defense Expenditures (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 1 2 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.22E-2) (0.23E-2) (0.27E-2) (0.28E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic. 2.10 2.10 1.62 2.08 No Rela-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 7.27 4.57 16.25 11.08 tionship 
Adjusted r2 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.985 
Public Consumption (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 3 3 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.22E-2) (0.21E-2) (0.69E-2) (0.74E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.10 2.07 1.70 1.74 Consumption-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 7.27 5.37 6.81 5.56 Investment 
Adjustedr2 0.986 0.988 0.975 0.975 (+w) 
Public Investment (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 1 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.22E-2) (0.24E-2) (0.93E-2) (0.63E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.10 2.18 1.57 2.04 Private-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 7.27 6.42 5.22 8.64 Public 
Adjusted r2 0.986 0.985 0.936 0.958 (+m) 
Public Investment (infrastructure) 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 3 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.22E-2) (0.23E-2) (0.20E-2) (21E-2) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.10 2.10 1.69 2.04 Private-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 7.27 4.69 4.99 10.57 Public 
Adjustedr2 0.986 0.985 0.932 0.958 (+m) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio Procedure 
was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in lograthmic 
form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs(+,-) 
represent the direction of impact. In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest 
final prediction error of relationships Band D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 
2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s =strong; m =moderate; w =weak) based on the 
size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical significance. 
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4. While one might anticipate that general government investment, 
especially in the areas of infrastructural expansion would provide a stimulus to 
private investment in manufacturing, this does not appear to be the case (fable 
1). In fact, causation is generally from private investment to public. For actual 
public investment (including both infrastructural and non-infrastructural 
components) the lag is rather short - a year. For longer term infrastructural 
investment (here proxied as expected investment) the lag tends to be about 
three years. Interestingly deviations of public investment from its historical 
exponential trend tend to impact negatively on private investment in 
manufacturing. 
5. Private investment in small scale manufacturing is again affected 
differently than that in larger scale firms. In this case (Table 2) public 
consumption expenditures provide a weak stimulus to the private sector. This 
lag is short, averaging about a year. 
6. Private investment in smaller scale industrial ventures interacted with 
public investment in a manner somewhat similar to that found in larger scale 
enterprises. However several minor differences do appear to characterize in-
vestment by the private sector. First, the lag between private investment and the 
government provision of infrastructure (anticipated investment) was shorter 
(one year) in the case of small scale firms. Secondly, while unanticipated (the 
difference between actual and anticipated) public investment impacted 
negatively (not ftshown here) on private investment in smaller scale firms, there 
were no statistically significant patterns between private investment and 
deviations from the exponential trend in public investment. 
As noted above, in looking for an explanation for these patterns, several 
previous papers have indicated that public sector crowding out of private 
investment may be occurring as a result of stepped-up government borrowing 
in the domestic financial markets. To examine this possibility, an analysis similar 
to that performed above was used to identify the linkages and causality patterns 
between the different broad types of public expenditures (defense, 
consumption, and general government investment) and potential sources of 
funding (deficits, domestic borrowing, and foreign borrowing). 
Again several interesting patterns appeared (Tables 3-5): 
1. Of the three types of government expenditures, those allocated to 
defense appear to have the most complex budgetary linkages. In one sense the 
military faces a hard budgetary constraint in th~ sense that increases in past 
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deficits tend to suppress the expansion in allocations to the military (fable 3). On 
the other hand increased defense expenditures do force an expansion in future 
deficits. 
2. This same general framework carried over to the borrowing patterns 
(fables 4 and 5) associated with military expenditures. For most measures of 
domestic borrowing, higher growth rates in funding for the domestic markets 
tends to suppress the expansion in future military expenditures. These 
suppressing effects are most important in cases were the rate of borrowing 
(domestic or foreign) expands over its anticipated (or longer term) growth rate. 
Still, feedback effects are present whereby military expenditures are in turn 
generally funded in part through both domestic and foreign borrowing. 
3. Since a large portion of public consumption consists of allocations to the 
military, the budgetary patterns of this expenditure category are a bit similar to 
that characterizing defense, particularly consumption's relationship to the fiscal 
deficit (Table 3). 
4. Several important differences do occur however. The major difference 
between defense expenditures and public consumption is associated with the 
manner in which each is actually funded. Increased growth in public consump-
tion definitely contributes to expanded domestic borrowing requirements over 
time (fable 4).J\lso the expansion in public consumption appears to be more 
constrained than defense during periods of expanded foreign borrowing 
(fable 5). 
5. Of the three types of government expenditures examined here, general 
government investment tends to have the strongest impact on the public sector 
deficit (Table 3). 
6. For all four measures of the deficit11, increases in general public invest-
ment tend to resulted in expanded fiscal imbalance (Table 3). While expanded 
deficits (actual and deviations from the exponential trend) facilitate a future 
expansion in public investment, this effect is weak relative to the impact of in-
vestment on the deficit. 
7. A clear link also exists between expanded public sector investment and 
increased future domestic borrowing requirements (Table 4). Interestingly 
enough few links exist between the growth in public investment and the 





Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, 
and the Fiscal Deficit, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
Expend Expend Deficit Deficit 
Expend Deficit Deficit Expend 
Defense (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 1 3 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.27E-2) (0.27E-2) (0.19) (0.12) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.62 1.76 1.97 2.35 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 16.25 17.84 4.04 8.75 (-w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.985 0.986 0.584 0.756 
Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 3 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.69E-2) (0.63E-2) (0.19) (0.13) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.70 1.76 1.97 1.76 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 6.82 3.51 4.04 4.37 (-w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.975 0.978 0.584 0.764 
General Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 3 4 
Final Prediction EPrnr (0.93E-2) (0.91E-2) (0.19) (0.86E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 1.75 1.97 2.70 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 5.22 4.41 4.04 24.68 (+w,+s) 
Adjusted r2 0.936 0.940 0.584 0.856 
General Public Infrastructure 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 2 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.93E-2) (0.lOE-1) (0.19) (0.64E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 1.84 1.97 2.23 lnfrastruct-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 5.22 6.32 4.04 15.10 Deficit 
Adjusted r2 0.936 0.910 0.584 0.791 (+m) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio Procedure 
was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in lograthmic 
form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs(+,-) 
represent the direction of impact. In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest 
final prediction error of relationships Band D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 
2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s :strong; m =moderate; w =weak) based on the 
size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical significance. 
96 
Table4: 
Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, 
and Public Sector Borrowing in Domestic Markets, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
Expend Expend Borrow Borrow 
Expend Borrow Borrow Expend 
Defense 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 3 3 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.27E-2) (0.27E-2) (0.26) (0.12) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.62 2.43 2.16 2.28 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 16.25 7.92 4.80 6.86 (-w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.985 0.987 0.284 0.444 
Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 1 3 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.69E-2) (0.77E-2) (0.26) (0.17) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.70 1.69 2.17 2.56 Consump.> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 6.82 6.49 4.80 10.29 Borrowing 
Adjusted r2 0.975 0.973 0.284 0.618 (+w) 
General Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 3 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.93E-2) (0.10E-1) (0.26) (0.18) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 1.58 2.17 1.86 Investment-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 5.22 4.14 4.80 8.52 Borrowing 
Adjusted r2 0.936 0.932 0.284 0.516 (+m) 
General Public Infrastructure 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 3 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.93E-2) (0.lOE-1) (0.26) (0.56E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 1.81 2.17 2.05 Investment-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 5.22 5.88 4.80 3.46 Borrowing 
Adjusted r2 0.936 0.909 0.284 0.322 (+w) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio Procedure 
was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in lograthmic 
form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs(+,-) 
represent the direction of impact. In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest 
final prediction error of relationships Band D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 
2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s :strong; m =moderate; w =weak) based on the 




Pakistan: Interaction of Public Expenditures, 
and Public Sector Borrowing in Foreign Markets, 1972-1991 
Causation Patterns Dominant 
Pattern 
Expend Expend Borrow Borrow 
Expend Borrow Borrow Expend 
Foreign Borrowing (actual) 
Optimal Lag (years) 2 4 3 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.27E-2) (0.22E-2) (0.17) (0.12) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.62 1.80 2.36 3.17 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 16.25 18.20 13.03 32.07 (+w,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.985 0.989 0.571 0.742 
Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 3 4 3 4 
Final Prediction Error (0.69E-2) (0.31E-2) (0.17) (0.15) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.70 1.82 2.36 2.32 Feedback 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 6.82 12.28 13.04 10.14 (-m,+w) 
Adjusted r2 0.975 0.989 0.571 0.688 
General Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 3 3 1 
Final Prediction &ror (0.93E-2) (0.95E-2) (0.17) (0.19) No Rela-
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 2.19 2.36 2.37 tionship 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 5.22 9.05 13.04 13.90 
Adjusted r2 0.936 0.922 0.571 0.540 
General Public Infrastructure 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 4 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.93E-2) (0.85E-2) (0.36E-1) (0.42E-1) 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.57 2.34 1.77 21.78 Borrowing-> 
Ling-Box Q Statistic 5.22 10.20 8.29 8.48 Investment 
Adjusted r2 0.936 0.914 0.574 0.527 (-w) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A Hsaio Procedure 
was incorporated to determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in lograthmic 
form. The dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction error. The signs(+,-) 
represent the direction of impact. In the case of feedback the two signs represent the lowest 
final prediction error of relationships Band D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 
2, 3, and 4 year lags. Strength assessment (s =strong; m =moderate; w =weak) based on the 
size of the standardized regression coefficient and t test of statistical significance. 
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IMPLICATIONS 
While the results presented above do not provide a definitive proof of the 
existence of the crowding out mechanism in Pakistan, they are quite consistent 
with what one might find if the phenomenon were present. Public investment 
and infrastructural development appears to have the least stimulating (and in 
some cases negative) effect on private sector investment. This is somewhat ironic 
given that a major purpose of these allocations is to provide a stimulus to follow 
on private investment. Clearly this effect stems from the large demands placed 
on the domestic capital market by this type of expenditure. 
At the other extreme is defense. Again a somewhat ironic pattern exists 
whereby expanded military expenditures provide a generally strong stimulus 
to private investment in large scale private manufacturing. While the analyses 
does not let us identify the cause of this stimulus (general Keynesian demand 
expansion and/or direct linkages to the country's military procurement 
program), the fact remains that the government has shown restraint in funding 
defense expenditures once domestic borrowings begin to accelerate. 
General public consumption falls somewhere in between defense and 
investment in affecting the private sector's willingness (or ability) to commit 
capital to ma";\Ufacturing. While the government does fund increased 
consumption through expanded domestic borrowing the magnitudes involved 
do not appear to be nearly as great as in the case of investment. Thus 
government consumption is still able to provide a net positive stimulus to small 
scale private investors (who presumably are not as reliant on the domestic 
capital markets as is the case for their larger scale counterparts). 
A MACRO-ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
The possible presence of crowding out resulting from increases in 
government investment and infrastructural development is important for 
policy design and as such warrants further analysis. For this purpose a small 





Pakistan: Defense and the Macroeconomy, Simulation Model, 1973-1991 
(constant 1985 prices) 
STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS 
(1) Gross Domestic Produce (GDP) 
GDP= - 127.80 + 11.94 EMP + 5.04 MILX(-1) 
(-3.81) (5.99)••• (8.20)**" 
r2(adj) = 0.998; DW = 2.19; 
+ 3.22 IPT 
(5.18)••• 
F = 2716.3 
(2) Defense Expenditures (MILX) 
MILX = - 4.90 + 0.12 GDP(-1) - 0.21 IGT(-1) - 0.14GDEF(-1) - 0.20GDEF(-2) 
(-4.21) (14.94)"** C-3.oor• c-2.2n.. <-3.33)**• 
r2(adj) = 0.987; DW = 1.91; F = 329.97 
(3) Non-Defense Expenditures (NILX) 
NILX = - 16.27 + 0.56 NILX(-1) + 2.91 IGGTP 
(-2.07) (3.08)*.. (2.71) .. 
r2(adj) = 0.947; Durbins H = - 0.51; F = 151.83 
(4) Private Investment in Large Scale Manufacturing (IPML) 
IPML = - 4.55 + 0.77 IPML(-1) - 0.08 BORD(-1) + 0.19 MILX(-1) 
(-3.71) (6.31)... (-2.81)** (2.81) .. 
• + 0.16 BORF(-1) + 0.19 GNSP 
(3.15)... (2.01) .. 
r2(adj) = 0.991; Durbins H = -1.24; F = 368.45 
(5) Private Investment in Small Scale Manufacturing (IPMS) 
IPMS= 0.01 + 0.871PMS(-1) - O.OOSBORD(-1) + 0.007NILX 
co.27) (8.34>""• <-3.25r• C3.86J**" 
r2(adj) = 0.995; Durbins H = -0.51; F = 885.13 
(6) Private Investment in Non-Manufacturing Activities (IPNMT) 
IPNMT= 2.46 + 0.07GDP(-1) - 0.34MILX - 0.087GNS 
(3.11> C7.13J""• <-3.05)*.. C3.2or• 
r2(adj) = 0.987; OW = 1.75; F = 414.98 
(7) Gross National Savings (GNS) 
GNS = - 32.69 + 0.29 GDP(-1) - 1.02 GDEF - 0.62 GDEF(-1) 
(-5.06) (10.22)... (-2.69).. (-1.97)• 
r2(adj) = 0.929; OW= 2.21; F = 75.33 
(8) Government Revenues (GR) 
GR= - 20.77 + 0.21GDP(-1) + 0.27DGDP(-1) 
r2(adj) = 0.991; DW = 1.85; •F =906.68 II 
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Table 6: (contd) 
Pakistan: Defense and the Macroeconomy, Simulation Model, 1973-1991 
(constant 1985 prices) 
STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS 
(9) Total Government Investment (IGT) 
IGT = 10.58 + 0.54 IGT(-1) + 0.13 GRT 
(4.14) (3.77)... (2.47)** 
r2(adj) = 0.934; Durbins H = -1.37; 
(10) General Government Investment IGGT) 
IGGT = 2.85 + 0.74 IGGT(-1) + 0.21 IPMT 
(2.53) (5.57)*** (1.92)* 
r2(adj) = 0.951; Durbins H = 0.353; 
(11) Public Domestic Borrowing (BORD) 
BORD = 12.99 + 0.73 GDEF - 0.91 BORF 
(4.01) (5.10)*** (-2.92)** 
F = 122.18 
F = 166.21 
r2(adj) = 0.610; OW= 2.37; F = 14.31 
(12) Public Foreign Borrowing (BORF) 
BORF= 7.57 + 0.32BORF(-1) + 0.47GDEF(-1) - 0.17GNSP(-1) 
(3.22) (2.07)** (4.59)*** (-3.74)*** 
r2(adj) = 0.740; Durbins H = -1.48; F = 17.15 
IDENTITIES 
(13) Government Expenditures (GE) 
GE = MILX + NILX 
(14) Government Deficit (GDEF) 
(8) GDEF = GE - GR 
(15) Change in GDP (DGDP) 
DGDP =GDP- GDP(-1) 
(16) Private Investment in Manufacturing (IPMT) 
IPMT = IPML + IPMS 
(17) Total Private Investment (IPT) 
IPT = IPMT + IPNMT 
EXOGENOUS 
(18) Employment (EMP) 
Notes: Two stage least squares estimations. See: SORITEC Integrated Econometric and 
Statistical Analysis Language, Version 6.6 Reference Manual, (Springfield, VA: Sorites 
Group, Inc., 1993) for a descrii:>tion of the procedure,. r2(adj) = adjusted coefficient of 
determination; F = F statistic; OW= Durbm Watson Statistic, Durbins H = Durbin's H 
statistic; (-1) =variable lagged one year. 
• 
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In constructing the model, our main concern was to capture the main areas 
that defense and other government expenditures might conceivably affect 
private investment. Specifically, the model attempts to capture the impact of 
public expenditures by type on the deficit, the impact of the deficit on the 
composition of public borrowing (domestic versus foreign) and domestic 
savings. Ultimately these links modify the private sector's decision to expand or 
contract capital formation in manufacturing. 
With regard to the more important individual equations (fable 1): 
1. Growth is affected mainly by employment, lagged military expenditures 
and private investment13. Interestingly, non-defense expenditures were not 
statistically significant in affecting GDP. The same was also true for government 
investment. 
2. Defense expenditures were found to be a function of lagged GDP. In 
addition allocations to the military were found to compete with other forms of 
public expenditures and were reduced with increased funding of government 
investment. As noted in the causality analysis, an expansion in the public deficit 
also depresses the rate of increase in follow on allocations to the military. 
3. Private investment in manufacturing follows a standard Koyc14 
distributed lag pattern. Funds allocated to this sector are reduced with increased 
levels of public sector borrowing in domestic markets (BORD). Some of the pres-
sure on capital mal'kets is reduced with increased foreign borrowing (BORF). As 
in the causality tests, military expenditures provides a stimulus to investment in 
large scale manufacturing (while non-defen~ expenditures provides a stimulus 
to investment in smaller scale plants). As noted by Khan and Iqbal (1991) 
private investment is strongly affected by the country's pattern of savings. 
4. Gross National Savings 15 expand with the overall growth of the economy. 
However these funds are pre-empted (or crowded out) by the fiscal deficit. 
Based on estimates over different time intervals the coefficients were found 
to be stable. Based on the Durbin Watson Statistic there does not appear to be a 
serious problem of autocorrelation. 
HISTORICAL SIMULATIONS 
To test the general accuracy of the model, a historical simulation was 
performed i.e. using the actual values for each variable, how well would the 
model have predicted each of the major variables over the period 1974 to 1991. 
The results (fable 7) were encouraging, particularly for the all-important GDP, 
and total private investment. The largest error for GDP was only 3.76 percent in 
the vear of political crisis 0 977). 
II 
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Because of their smaller, absolute values, however, the errors were often 
high for private investment in manufacturing. Still, during the last several years 
the predicted figures for private capital allocations to this sector were close to 
the actual figures. 
Roughly the same picture emerges when general government investment 
was treated as exogenous i.e., when actual rather than estimated values were 
used in the model' solution (Table 8). 
The next step was to get a rough idea of the quantitative magnitudes of 
impact produced by changes in government investment. In the first set of 
simulations, government investment was increased (Table 9) by 2.5% and 10% 
over its historical values (with the other behavioral equations left endogenous). 
As a basis of comparison, the Base figures are those derived (in Table 8) from the 
actual (realized) levels of government investment. 
The results (Table 9) of this simulation provide interesting insights to the 
dynamics of the Pakistani economy. In particular, increased levels of 
government investment tend to reduce GDP. The suppression in GDP occurs 
through the associated reduction in defense expenditures (given the 
insensitivity of private investment to changes in the levels of public capital 
formation). .. 
Up to now the simulations have assumed that the pattern of public external 
borrowing is largely passive, that is determined by the endogenous equation 12 
in Table 6. If instead, it is assumed that the government is constrained (to some 
preassigned level) in its borrowing in foreign capital markets the results of the 
simulations change dramatically (Table 10). 
Again as a basis of comparison, three separate values are given for each of 
the key macroeconomic aggregates: (a) the endogenous values are those 
obtained by letting public foreign borrowing increase as in Table 9; (b) actual 
refers to the results obtained when public foreign borrowing was constrained to 
its realized values over the 1974-1991 period; and (c) actual plus 10% are the 
values obtained on the assumption that the government could not increase 
foreign borrowing at will i.e., the government could increase its foreign 




Macroeconomic Simulation I, Endogenous Model, 1974-1991 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Gross Domestic Product Total Private Investment 
Year Actual Est % Dif Actual Est % Dif 
1974 246.0 245.6 0.19 15.7 17.1 7.75 
1975 256.8 259.8 1.17 17.5 17.9 2.30 
1976 268.8 270.4 0.59 19.3 18.4 5.80 
1977 278.9 290.2 3.91 20.9 19.1 9.48 
1978 301.4 305.6 1.36 21.7 21.0 3.63 
1979 315.9 324.6 2.69 22.4 22.4 0.00 
1980 343.4 341.4 0.59 26.4 24.1 9.61 
1981 367.0 363.7 0.92 28.5 26.1 9.42 
1982 391.0 383.6 1.95 28.1 28.4 0.87 
1983 417.9 408.2 2.38 30.7 30.6 0.23 
1984 438.7 432.5 1.43 32.8 33.3 1.31 
1985 472.2 460.4 2.56 35.8 36.1 0.68 
1986 498.1 481.4 3.47 38.7 39.2 1.26 
1987 530.1 523.3 1.29 41.1 41.9 2.04 
1988 570.9 549.2 3.95 43.8 46.5 5.99 
1989 611.9 588.5 3.97 51.0 49.8 2.44 
1990 630.9 624.4 1.04 56.0 54.2 3.34 
1991 672.0 .. 670.4 024 60.1 59.1 1.79 
Private Non-Manuf Invest Private Manufacturing Invest 
Year Actual Est % Dif Actual Est % Dif 
1974 12.8 13.3 4.18 2.97 3.74 20.48 
1975 14.0 14.6 3.67 3.41 3.29 3.85 
1976 15.5 15.1 2.35 3.86 3.15 22.36 
1977 16.9 15.8 6.61 4.06 3.29 23.25 
1978 17.9 17.3 3.40 3.84 3.67 4.70 
1979 18.6 18.2 2.24 3.84 4.15 7.60 
1980 21.8 19.1 14.63 4.56 5.03 9.41 
1981 22.5 20.0 12.47 6.00 6.03 0.54 
1982 21.5 21.2 1.74 6.61 7.23 8.51 
1983 22.9 22.1 3.44 7.81 8.50 8.12 
1984 23.9 23.3 2.64 8.94 9.99 10.49 
1985 25.8 24.5 5.31 10.02 11.57 13.38 
1986 26.8 25.9 3.67 11.88 13.32 10.82 
1987 28.5 26.8 6:18 12.57 15.09 16.65 
1988 29.8 29.2 1.86 13.98 17.31 19.24 
1989 32.5 30.4 6.90 18.51 19.40 4.56 
1990 34.3 32.1 6.66 21.71 22.05 1.50 
1991 36.4 34.4 5.89 23.73 24.07 3.92 




Macroeconomic Simulation II: 
General Government Investment Set at Historical Values, 
Foreign Public Borrowing Endogenous, 1974-1991 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Gross Domestic Product Total Private Investment 
Year Actual Est % Dif Actual Est % Dif 
1974 246.0 245.5 0.23 15.7 17.0 7.58 
1975 256.8 260.0 1.25 17.5 17.9 2.30 
1976 268.8 269.9 0.38 19.3 18.2 5.88 
1977 278.9 290.0 3.76 20.9 19.0 10.42 
1978 301.4 306.8 1.77 21.7 21.5 1.04 
1979 315.9 322.5 2.06 22.4 22.7 0.94 
1980 343.4 342.4 0.27 26.4 23.6 11.79 
1981 367.0 369.4 0.64 28.5 25.2 13.15 
1982 391.0 393.1 0.54 28.1 27.1 4.01 
1983 417.9 423.0 1.21 30.7 30.0 2.44 
1984 438.7 445.9 1.63 32.8 33.6 2.32 
1985 472.2 469.6 0.55 35.8 36.0 0.58 
1986 498.1 491.5 1.34 38.7 38.6 0.15 
1987 530.1 534.2 0.78 41.1 41.8 1.76 
1988 570.9 557.0 2.51 43.8 46.9 6.73 
1989 611.9 593.0 3.19 51.0 50.5 0.97 
1990 630.9 625.6 0.85 56.0 54.9 1.95 
1991 672.0 670.3 0.25 60.1 59.1 1.65 
Private Non-Manuf Invest Private Manufacturing Invest 
Year Actual Est % Dif Actual Est %Dif 
1974 12.8 13.3 4.02 2.97 3.73 20.29 
1975 14.0 14.6 3.94 3.41 3.32 3.01 
1976 15.5 15.1 2.34 3.86 3.13 22.99 
1977 16.9 15.7 7.61 4.06 3.28 23.89 
1978 17.9 17.6 1.39 3.84 3.87 0.56 
1979 18.6 18.5 0.50 3.84 4.15 7.34 
1980 21.8 18.7 16.83 4.56 4.92 7.36 
1981 22.5 19.5 15.17 6.00 5.65 6.17 
1982 21.5 20.5 4.83 6.61 6.52 1.43 
1983 22.9 22.0 3.83 7.81 7.92 1.42 
1984 23.9 24.1 0.87 8.94 9.51 6.01 
1985 25.8 25.0 3.27 10.02 11.04 9.28 
1986 26.8 25.8 4.04 11.88 12.86 7.65 
1987 28.5 27.1 5.26 12.57 14.73 14.65 
1988 29.8 29.8 0.20 13.98 17.08 18.15 
1989 32.5 31.1 4.48 18.51 19.42 4.66 
1990 34.3 32.8 4.65 21.71 22.17 2.04 
1991 36.4 34.4 5.66 23.73 24.70 3.92 
Notes: Model simulation based on equations in Table 6. 
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Table 9: 
Macroeconomic Simulation III: General Government Investment 2.53 
and 103 over Historical Values, Foreign Public Borrowing Endogenous 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Gross Domestic Product Total Private Investment 
Year 2.53 Base 10.03 2.53 Base 10.03 
1974 245.3 245.5 244.9 17.0 17.0 16.9 
1975 260.0 260.0 259.8 17.9 17.9 17.9 
1976 269.4 269.9 268.0 18.3 18.2 18.6 
1977 288.5 290.0 284.7 19.1 19.0 19.4 
1978 304.9 306.8 299.0 21.6 21.5 22.0 
1979 319.8 322.5 311.6 22.8 22.7 23.3 
1980 338.9 342.4 328.1 23.8 23.6 24.3 
1981 365.1 369.4 352.2 25.4 25.2 25.8 
1982 388.2 393.1 373.6 27.2 27.1 27.7 
1983 417.5 423.0 401.0 30.1 30.0 30.7 
1984 439.7 445.9 420.9 33.8 33.6 34.5 
1985 462.6 469.6 441.6 36.2 36.0 36.8 
1986 483.9 491.5 461.1 38.8 38.6 39.4 
1987 526.0 534.2 501.2 42.0 41.8 42.7 
1988 548.0 557.0 521.1 47.2 46.9 47.8 
1989 683.3 593.0 554.2 50.8 50.5 51.5 
1990 615.1 625.6 583.7 55.2 54.9 56.0 
1991 659.0 670.3 625.3 59.4 59.1 60.2 
Private Non-Manuf Invest Private Manufacturing Invest 
Year 2.53 Base 10.03 2.53 Base 10.03 
1974 13.3 13.3 13.2 3.72 3.73 3.68 
1975 14.6 14.6 14.5 3.33 3.32 3.35 
1976 15.2 15.1 15.3 3.17 3.13 3.28 
1977 15.7 15.7 15.9 3.34 3.28 3.53 
1978 17.7 17.6 17.7 3.98 3.87 4.30 
1979 18.5 18.5 18.6 4.29 4.15 4.72 
1980 18.7 18.7 18.7 5.10 4.92 5.62 
1981 19.5 19.5 19.4 5.85 5.65 6.45 
1982 20.5 20.5 20.3 6.74 6.52 7.41 
1983 22.0 22.0 21.8 8.18 7.92 8.94 
1984 24.0 24.1 23.8 9.80 9.51 10.63 
1985 24.9 25.0 24.6 11.34 11.04 12.26 
1986 25.6 25.8 25.2 13.19 12.86 14.18 
1987 26.9 27.1 26.5 15.09 14.73 16.16 
1988 29.7 29.8 29".2 17.46 17.08 18.61 
1989 30.9 31.1 30.4 19.83 19.42 21.08 
1990 32.6 32.8 32.0 22.61 22.17 23.94 
1991 34.2 34.4 33.6 25.17 24.70 26.58 




Macroeconomic Simulation IV: 
General Government Investment 2.5% over Historical Values, With 
Varying Patterns of Foreign Public Borrowing 
(billions of 1985 rupees) 
Gross Domestic Product Total Private Investment 
Year Borrow.: Endogen Actual Act+10% Endogenous Actual Act+10% 
1974 245.3 245.5 245.9 17.0 17.0 17.2 
1975 260.0 259.3 260.6 17.9 17.7 18.1 
1976 269.4 272.4 277.2 18.3 19.3 20.0 
1977 288.5 294.7 299.2 19.1 21.1 22.2 
1978 304.9 311.2 317.6 21.6 23.1 24.4 
1979 319.8 325.9 334.6 22.8 23.3 25.0 
1980 338.9 346.6 358.2 23.8 24.4 26.4 
1981 365.1 373.1 387.4 25.4 26.3 28.7 
1982 388.2 399.6 414.3 27.2 28.2 31.0 
1983 417.5 424.4 445.8 30.1 30.5 33.8 
1984 439.7 442.1 468.7 33.8 32.8 36.6 
1985 462.6 459.7 489.9 36.2 33.7 38.2 
1986 483.9 472.7 508.3 38.8 34.5 39.6 
1987 526.0 503.8 545.6 42.0 35.8 41.8 
1988 548.0 511.0 560.0 47.2 38.4 45.4 
1989 583.3 530.2 587.8 50.8 39.7 47.9 
1990 615.1 545.7 613.6 55.2 42.4 52.2 
1991 Q,79.0 570.7 650.5 59.4 44.6 56.1 
Private Non-Manuf Invest Private Manuf Invest 
Year Borrow.: Endogen Actual Act+10% · Endogenous Actual Act+10% 
1974 13.2 13.2 13.2 3.72 3.71 3.90 
1975 14.6 14.6 14.6 3.32 3.11 3.49 
1976 15.2 15.1 15.2 3.17 4.17 4.85 
1977 15.7 15.9 16.1 3.34 5.20 6.17 
1978 17.7 18.0 18.2 3.98 5.09 5.25 
1979 18.5 18.7 18.9 4.29 4.67 6.04 
1980 18.7 18.9 19.2 5.10 5.53 7.17 
1981 19.5 19.0 20.3 5.85 6.39 8.32 
1982 20.5 20.8 21.4 6.74 7.44 9.69 
1983 22.0 22.2 22.9 8.18 8.22 10.81 
1984 24.0 24.3 25.1 9.80 8.56 11.53 
1985 24.9 25.0 26.0 11.35 8.79 12.22 
1986 25.6 25.4 26.6 13.19 9.08 13.00 
1987 26.9 26.4 27.8 15.09 9.43 14.00 
1988 29.7 28.8 30.4 17.46 9.68 15.02 
1989 30.9 29.4 31.3 19.83 10.29 16.59 
1990 32.6 30.4 32.7 22.61 11.96 19.45 
1991 34.2 31.5 34.2 25.17 13.05 21.88 




On the basis of these assumptions it can be easily seen that even with modest 
increases (2.5%) in government investment, the economy would come under 
severe strains (fable 10). In particular: 
1. With no increase in public external borrowing in 1991, GDP would decline 
from 659 billion rupees to 570.7. 
2. The economy's extreme dependence on external borrowing to offset the 
public sector's crowding out of private investment appears to have developed 
around 1984/85 (as evidenced by the widening gap between the values 
obtained in actual and endogenous simulations). 
3. This extreme dependence is evidenced by the fact that in recent years a 2.5 
percent increase in government investment would have to be matched by an 
increase in public foreign borrowing of over 10 percent simply to preserve levels 
of investment and GDP that would have occurred in the absence of these 
increases in government investment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While a complete explanation of the reasons the government has chosen to 
fund certain expenditures in certain markets is beyond the scope of this study, it 
is clear that if the Pakistani authorities wish to play a more productive role in the 
country's development, they will have to devote just as much attention to the 
financial impacts of public investment has they have to the direct economic 
impacts. 
NOTES 
1. See for example (Kemal, 1989); (Burney and Yasmeen 1989) and (Khan and Iq-
bal (1991) 
2. As Richards and Waterbury note: "We may estimate, counterfactually, the 
returns on alternative uses of the monies devoted to defense, but practically 
nowhere in the world is there any assurance that reduced defense budgets 
would result in increased outlay on say, social welfare or infrastructure. 
Defense outlays are laden with the symbols and sentiments of national pride 
and survival. People seem prepared to accept disproportionate public 
investment in defense. They and their leaders find less justification in using 
equivalent resources to reduce adult illiteracy or line irrigation ditches. 
(Richards and Waterbury, 1990: 360-61). 
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3. See Looney (1992 a), Looney (1992 a) and Robert E. Looney "Infrastructural 
constraints on Energy Development: The Case of Pakistan" The Journal of 
Energy and Development. XVl/2, (Spring 1991), 267-286. 
4. Gupta does make an attempt to identify the relevant lag structure, but these are 
arrived at in a somewhat arbitrary manner. 
5. If the disturbances of the model were serially correlated, the OLS estimates 
would be inefficient, although still unbiased, and would distort the causal 
relations. The existence of serial correlation was checked by using a maximum 
likelihood correlation for the first-order autocorrelation of the residuals 
[AR(l)]. The comparison of both OLS and AR(l) results indicated that no sig-
nificant changes appeared in causal directions. Therefore, we can conclude 
"roughly" that serial correlation was not serious in this model. 
6. Since the F statistic is redundant in this instance they are not reported here. 
They are, however, available from the authors upon request. 
7. Causation tests were performed using a program written in RA TS386 Version 
4.0. Cf. Thomas A. Doan, RATS User's Manual Version 4 (Evanston, Illinois: 
Estima, 1992). 
8. The reasons underlying involve the assumption of stationary conditions. See 
Hsiao (1981), and Joerding (1986). 
9. As a practical matter, the results were insensitive to the manner in which a 
variable was defined - actual, expected, and unexpected usually provided a 
consistent picture. Because of this only the actual impacts are summarized in 
the tables below. However because of its importance government 
investment in the form of infrastructure (here proxied as expected, or on-going 
government expenditure are also included in the set of main findings. The 
findings for the other variable definitions are available from the author upon 
request. 
10. Again those for anticipated (expected) and unanticipated (unexpected) are 
not presented in detail. They are however available from the author upon 
request. 
11. Again only the results for the actual (realized) deficit are presented here. 
12. I am indebted to a referee for noting that the causality tests in and of 
themselves are insufficient for assessing the problem of crowding out . 
. :·:~. ·_ ,. ,.· / _·-r·--.,;,, ••. 
··.::_~::·"· :'.;· --. ''-' '· ' :·.;;;" ~~~. 
;;;.§·--;~;;~~--~- l:;;~;:~:,:~~k~i~&~~-t~;· 
109 
13. Ideally one would have liked to use a neo-classical formulation of the type 
developed by Mintz and Huang and adopted successfully by Ward et al to 
the Indian situation. Unfortunately in the case of Pakistan several of the key 
variables (in particular non-defense expenditures and government 
investment) were not statistically significant. See Mintz and Huang (1990) 
and Ward et al. (1992) 
14. See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976) for a description of this model and its 
theoretical rationale. 
15. It should be noted that Gross National Savings is used here. Due to the large 
component of worker remittances Gross Domestic Savings fluctuates 
erratically. These remittances are no doubt purely exogenous and as such 
tend to mask the relationship between government expenditures, the deficit 
and the change in savings. 
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1988 y1lmm sonlarma dogru Pakistan'da ortaya i:;1kan ekonomik kriz halen 
onemini siirdiirmektedir. Artan biiti:;e ai:;1klan, kronik enflasyon ve giderek 
bozulan di§ odemeler dengesi pozisyonu iilkenin biiyiime potansiyelini 
olumsuz yonde etkilemektedir. Kamu kesimi dengelerinin yeniden kurulmas1 
ozel kesim yatmmlanmn ve dolay1s1yla biiyiimenin canlandmlmas1 ai:;1smdan 
kilit onem ta§1maktd1r. 
Kamu kesimin yeniden yapilanmas1 ise biiyiik oli:;iide devlet harcamalannm 
azaltilmas1 ve vergi gelirlcrinin arttmlmasma baghd1r. Son yillarda biiti:;e % 65-
75 odeneklerinin diizeyinde bir bOliimiin savunma harcamalarma ayrlld1g1 goz 
oniine ahnd1gmda, savunma harcamalarmda ciddi bir k1smt1ya gidilmesinin 
kamu kesimi dengesi ve biiyiime iizerinde geri:;ekle§tireccgi olumlu etkiler 
ai:;1ki:;a ortaya i:;1kmaktad1r. 
